

Evaluation of the implementation of Law No. 16 of 1964 on Purse Seine Fishermen in Sibolga City, North Sumatra Province

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964 concerning Fisheries Profit Sharing in purse seine fisheries in Sibolga City, North Sumatra Province, and to evaluate its implementation based on internal and external factors. The study was conducted from February to March 2026 in Sibolga City using a survey method and a quantitative descriptive approach. Respondents in the study numbered 40 people consisting of 8 ship owners and 32 crew members (ABK), who were determined by purposive sampling. Data collection was carried out through observation, interviews, documentation, and questionnaires using a Likert scale. The results of the study indicate that the profit sharing system applied after deducting operational costs is 60% for ship owners and 40% for crew members. The distribution has fulfilled minimum share requirements fisherman laborer as used in research. However, the implementation for results still face problem in the form of low transparency in delivery results catch, receipts, and costs operational as well as low understanding fisherman to Constitution Number 16 of 1964. Based on internal factors, experience and potential fish resources are the supporting factors for implementation, while transparency is the weakest factor. The most supporting external factors are operational costs and fish prices, while government outreach is the weakest factor. Thus, the implementation of the percentage profit-sharing system is in accordance with the provisions that form the basis for evaluation, but still requires increased transparency, fishermen's understanding, outreach, guidance, and government supervision so that the implementation of profit-sharing can run more fairly and effectively.

Keywords: Law Number 16 of 1964, fisheries profit sharing, purse seine, fishermen, Sibolga City

Introduction

Capture fisheries is a strategic sector in Indonesia's economic development because it plays a role as a food source, a source of income for coastal communities, and a job creator (Amura, 2021) ^[3]. In the practice of capture fisheries, the working relationship between vessel owners and fishermen is inseparable from the profit-sharing system. To ensure fairness and protection for all parties, the Indonesian government has enacted Law No. 16 of 1964 concerning Fisheries Profit Sharing, which specifically regulates the profit-sharing agreement mechanism, the proportion of profit sharing, and the government's role in preventing extortion of fishermen.

In capture fisheries, the profit-sharing system is legally based in Law Number 16 of 1964 concerning Fisheries Profit Sharing. This regulation governs the distribution of fisheries profits between vessel owners and fishermen.

In practice, the implementation of these provisions needs to be seen based on the conditions that occur in the field, because the implementation of the profit sharing system is not only related to the percentage of distribution, but also to the calculation of operational costs, transparency of catch results, working relationships between ship owners and crew (ABK), and fishermen's understanding of the applicable provisions. The concept of implementation shows that the success of implementing a policy is not only determined by the existence of rules, but also by the implementation process and the involvement of various parties in achieving policy objectives (Winarno, 2016) ^[17].

Fishermen's welfare is not only determined by their income but also by access to resources, ownership of productive

assets, social relationships, and household economic resilience. Sari *et al.* (2020) ^[8] explain that a socioeconomic approach is necessary to understand the relationship between fishing activities and fishermen's living conditions and the factors that influence their welfare. Fishermen's income is also influenced by the catch and fishing season conditions, while the profit-sharing system is one mechanism used to distribute income among the parties involved in fishing activities (Triyanti *et al.*, 2016) ^[15].

Sibolga City is one of the areas with capture fisheries activities involving the use of purse seine fishing gear. In practice, the purse seine fishing effort involves the vessel owner and crew, with the division of tasks and income based on the applicable system. This condition requires an assessment of the implementation of the profit-sharing system to determine its compliance with the provisions of Law Number 16 of 1964. In addition, the implementation of the profit-sharing system can be influenced by internal factors, such as the experience of fishermen, cooperation between vessel owners and crew, fishing equipment, potential fish resources, and transparency, as well as external factors such as government support, weather conditions, operational costs, fish prices, and competition between fishermen.

The profit-sharing system on purse seine vessels in Sibolga City still uses a 60:40 distribution pattern, namely 60% for the vessel owner and 40% for the crew after deducting operational costs. Although this distribution pattern has met the minimum share for smallholder fishermen as stipulated in Law Number 16 of 1964, in its implementation there are still limitations in the transparency of the calculation of

operational costs and net profits. Crew members generally receive a predetermined share of the profits based on the agreement, but are not always aware of the details of the net profit calculation process. This condition indicates that the implementation of the profit-sharing system still needs to be evaluated, especially in terms of transparency and understanding of the applicable provisions.

Based on these conditions, an evaluation of the implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964 on purse seine fishing in Sibolga City is necessary. This evaluation is crucial to determine the extent to which the law's provisions have been implemented in practice and to identify areas that still need improvement, particularly transparency, fishermen's understanding, and government oversight. The research results are expected to provide an overview of the implementation of the profit-sharing system and serve as a basis for improving the implementation of more transparent and equitable fisheries policies.

Literature review

Constitution Number 16 of 1964

Law Number 16 of 1964 concerning Fisheries Profit Sharing is the legal basis for regulating profit sharing between vessel owners and working fishermen. In marine fisheries, Article 3 paragraph (1) letter b stipulates that working fishermen receive a share of at least 40% of the net profit. In addition, the distribution of profits among working fishermen can be regulated based on an agreement while still paying attention to applicable provisions. In this study, these provisions are used as a basis for evaluating the suitability of the profit sharing system applied to purse seine fishermen in Sibolga City.

Fisherman

Fishermen are workers involved in fishing activities, either as vessel owners or as laborers or crew members (ABK). The vessel owner's role is to provide the vessel, fishing gear, capital, and bear operational costs and business risks, while the ABK are directly involved in fishing operations. In purse seine fishing, the number of ABK is generally greater than the vessel owner because operating fishing gear requires a significant workforce. This condition was also found by Maulina *et al.* (2024) ^[5], who demonstrated the dominance of ABK in the workforce structure in purse seine fishing businesses.

Purse Seine Fishing Gear

Purse seine fishing gear is used to catch pelagic fish that live in schools. The gear is operated by encircling a school of fish with a net, then closing the bottom of the net so that the fish are collected in a net bag. Purse seine fishing gear is used in various capture fisheries areas in Indonesia and is one of the fishing gear used by fishermen in Sibolga City. Research by Ranto *et al.* (2021) ^[11] also discusses the implementation of fisheries policies for purse seine fishermen in Sibolga City, although the focus is different because the study focuses on fishing gear policies, not the profit-sharing system based on Law Number 16 of 1964.

Profit Sharing System

The profit-sharing system is a mechanism for dividing profits between the vessel owner and the fishermen involved

in fishing activities. Profit sharing is generally done after deducting operational costs from the catch, and the net proceeds are then distributed based on an agreed-upon distribution. The size of each party's share can be influenced by their role, responsibilities, workforce, capital, and the risks involved in the fishing activity.

In the purse seine business in Sibolga City, the profit-sharing system found in the study is 60% for the vessel owner and 40% for the crew. This system meets the minimum limit of 40% for the share of the fisherman as stipulated in Law Number 16 of 1964. Research by Alan *et al.* (2015) ^[1] also shows that the profit-sharing system in the purse seine business can provide a larger share to the vessel owner because the owner bears the capital and production costs. However, the profit-sharing pattern in the purse seine business is not always the same in every region. Sugiarto *et al.* (2023) ^[13] found a 50% distribution pattern for the owner and 50% for the crew in the purse seine business in Batam.

Income Fisherman

Income fisherman is results received from activity arrest after take into account cost incurred during activity business . The size income influenced by the number results catch , fish price , cost operational , condition weather , season arrest , and system distribution results . Sitanggang *et al.* (2025) stated that income purse seine fishermen at PPN Sibolga influenced by the system for results , amount results catch , and costs operational arrest . Nurdiana *et al.* (2022) ^[6] also stated that amount results catch and costs operational is related factors with income fisherman .

Research methods

The research was conducted from February to March 2026 in the coastal area and surrounding the Sibolga Nusantara Fisheries Port (PPN), Sibolga City, North Sumatra Province. The research location was determined purposively because it is an area of purse seine fishing activity. The study used a survey method with a quantitative descriptive approach through observation, interviews, and questionnaires.

The research respondents numbered 40 people, consisting of 8 ship owners and 32 crew members. Data collected included respondent characteristics, catches, revenues, operational costs, profit-sharing systems, income, and internal and external factors related to the implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964.

Data analysis was conducted using quantitative descriptive methods. Revenue analysis included costs, revenues, net income, and the profit-sharing system. Total costs were calculated using the formula $TC = TFC + TVC$, while revenue was calculated based on catch sales. This calculation refers to the method used by Sari *et al.* (2020) ^[8], while the revenue concept refers to Suartiyah (2015).

Internal and external factors were analyzed using a Likert scale. Internal factors included fishermen's experience, cooperation between vessel owners and crew, fishing equipment, fish resource potential, and transparency of the profit-sharing system. External factors included government outreach, weather conditions, operational costs, fish prices, and competition among fishermen.

Results and Discussion

Characteristics Respondents




Fig 1: Respondent status graph based on occupation

Based on Table 1, the research respondents numbered 40 people, consisting of 8 ship owners (20%) and 32 crew members (80%). The larger number of crew members compared to ship owners is related to the labor requirements in purse seine operations, which involve several divisions of

tasks during fishing activities. Purse seine fishing activities involve workers with different tasks, such as captains, motorists, cooks, and net arrangers. Thus, the composition of respondents in this study illustrates the labor structure in the purse seine fishing business.




Fig 2: Experience Work respondents

Based on Figure 2, the work experience of 40 respondents in Sibolga varied from 5 to 20 years, with the majority (32%) having 6–10 years of experience. This indicates that most respondents have worked for a considerable amount of time and possess adequate skills and knowledge. According to Asrofiyah *et al.*, (2023), fishermen's work experience is

divided into three categories: inexperienced (<3 years), experienced (± 3 –6 years), and highly experienced (>6 years).

Purse Seine Fishermen's Catch

Table 1: Catch of purse seine fishermen

No	Boat	GT	Trip Duration (Days)	Total (Kg)	Total Revenue (Rp/trip)
1.	KM. Deli Batam	50	15	16,640	353,850,000
2.	KM. Makmur	58	15	30,900	690,650,000
3.	KM. Samosir 08	76	15	30,110	632,880,000
4.	KM. Citra Abdai	77	15	14,835	289,140,000
5.	KM. Camar	88	15	19,230	400,050,000

6.	KM. Cahaya Mas	88	16	18,600	426,060,000
7.	KM. Nusantara Baru	103	17	13,536	318,608,000
8.	KM. Elisabeth	98	18	18,050	399,830,000
	Average				438,921,000

Based on Table 1, the average income of fishermen from 8 *purse seine vessels* in Sibolga was Rp438,921,000 per trip. This income was obtained from catches consisting of skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna, and mackerel with prices of Rp20,000/kg for skipjack tuna , Rp33,000/kg for yellowfin tuna , and Rp18,000/kg for mackerel , respectively. The KM. Makmur recorded the highest income of Rp690,950,000, while the KM. Citra Abdai recorded the lowest at Rp289,140,000 due to engine problems and bad weather at sea, with the main catch consisting of skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna, and mackerel. Each boat own different GT sizes and trip lengths so that amount results The catches and revenues obtained also differed. The vessel sizes in this study ranged from 50–103 GT, while the trip lengths ranged from 15–18 days.

Fixed Cost

Cost still is costs that are not finished in one time production and quantity relatively No changed although happen change amount production. Cost still generally in the form of cost depreciation investments usedin activity fishing, such as ships, machines , tools catch , and equipment others . The size cost still greatly influenced by age economical from every investments ownedfishermen. Increasingly big mark investment and more short age economical something tools, then cost its shrinkage will the more large. According to Weileruny *et al.*, (2022) the cost still is costs of use No influenced by size small results production in something business .

Table 2: Fixed costs of fishermen using purse seine fishing gear

No	Boat	Total Fixed Costs (Rp)
1.	KM. Deli Batam	12,681,180
2.	KM. Makmur	13,742,978
3.	KM. Samosir 08	13,555,712
4.	KM. Citra Abdai	15,742,978
5.	KM. Camar	14,242,978
6.	KM. Cahaya Mas	14,242,978
7.	KM. Nusantara Baru	14,073,447
8.	KM. Elisabeth	16,734,385
	Average	14,377,080

Based on Table 2, the total cost still eight *purse seine vessels* range The average fixed cost ranged from Rp12,681,180 to Rp16,734,385 per trip, with an average of Rp14,377,080 per trip. The lowest fixed costs were found

on the KM. Deli Batam, while the highest were on the KM. Elisabeth. This difference indicates variations in fixed costs between vessels related to depreciation, mooring, and maintenance of the vessel and fishing gear. Fixed costs were then used in conjunction with variable costs to determine the total cost of the fishing effort.

Cost Variable / Non-Fixed Costs

Cost variables is out- of -pocket expenses in one time production and quantity changed along with the volume of activities carried out Costs This No fixed and influenced by large small amount production obtained . The variable costs of *purse seine* fishermen can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3: Variable costs of purse seine fishermen

No	Boat	Total cost Variables (Rp)
1.	KM. Deli Batam	132,760,000
2.	KM. Makmur	137,660,000
3.	KM. Samosir 08	135,410,000
4.	KM. Citra Abdai	145,265,000
5.	KM. Camar	144,715,000
6.	KM. Cahaya Mas	142,715,000
7.	KM. Nusantara Baru	142,765,000
8.	KM. Elisabeth	146,515,000
	Average	140,975,625

Based on Table 3, the total cost variables eight *purse seine vessels* range The variable costs ranged from Rp132,760,000 to Rp146,515,000 per trip, with an average of Rp140,975,625 per trip. The lowest variable costs were found on the KM. Deli Batam, while the highest were on the KM. Elisabeth. This difference indicates variations in operational costs between vessels during fishing activities. Variable costs were then used alongside fixed costs to determine the total operating costs.

Purse Seine Fishermen's Profit Sharing System

Research result show that system for results fisherman *purse seine in* Sibolga City done based on agreement between owner ship and crew after reduced cost operational arrest . In in practice , the owner boat get part more results big compared to ABK because owner boat cover business capital , costs material burn , maintenance ships , and needs operational others . System distribution results the Already fully referring to the provisions Constitution Number 16 of 1964 concerning Fisheries Profit Sharing.

Table 4: System for results

Boat	Net Result (Rp)	Owner 60% (Rp)	ABK 40% (Rp)
KM. Deli Batam	208,408,820	125,045,292.00	83,363,528.00
KM. Makmur	539,247,022	323,548,213.20	215,698,808.80
KM. S amosir 08	483,914,288	290,348,572.80	193,565,715.20
KM. Cintra Abdi	128,132,022	76,879,213.20	51,252,808.80
KM. Camar	241,092,022	144,655,213.20	96,436,808.80
KM. Cahaya Mas	269,102,022	161,461,213.20	107,640,808.80
KM. Nusantara baru	161,769,553	97,061,731.80	64,707,821.20
KM. Elisabeth	236,580,615	141,948,369.00	94,632,246.00
Average	283,530,796	170,118,477	113,412,318

Based on Table 4, the average results clean business *purse seine* of Rp283,530,796 per trip. Net result the shared based on system for the results applied, namely 60 % for owner ship and 40% for the crew. Thus, the average share owner boat amounting to Rp. 170,118,477 per trip, while ABK's share is Rp113,412,318 per trip. The difference results clean every boat cause amount income received owner the ships and crew are also different .

Division results the show that system for applied results has take into account results clean business after all over cost operational reduced from acceptance . This is in line with principle for results in Constitution Number 16 of 1964 concerning Fisheries Profit Sharing, namely distribution results done after take into account related costs with business fishing . Thus, the division results applied to the ship *purse seine* in study This show existence distribution between owner boat as the party providing capital and facilities arrest with fisherman laborer as the party that does it activity arrest.

Based on results research , 60% distribution for owner ship and 40% for crew members it is said has in accordance with provisions that become base study if agreement the implemented after subtraction costs effort and not reduce ABK rights as applicable provision . Thus, suitability system for results No only seen from percentage division , but also from base calculation results clean , the receiving party parts , and implementation distribution results in a way real between owner ship and crew.

Evaluation Implementation of Law no. 16 of 1964

Evaluation implementation of Law no. 16 of 1964 against fisherman *purse seine* in Sibolga City done in a way descriptive with see internal factors and external factors external influences implementation system for results in the field . Analysis This aim For know condition implementation system for results between owner ship and child fruit ship (ABK) based on the reality that occurs in society fishermen. According to Tanzil (2019) ^[14] the relationship work in the community fisherman generally Still influenced by bonds social , patron- client , and dependency economy so that implementation system for results often walk based on habit local compared to formal government rules .

Although distribution results has appropriate, still there is necessary factors noticed in its implementation , especially understanding fisherman to provision law and supervision from government . The low understanding fisherman to regulation and weakness supervision government can influence implementation system for results. In addition, research by Sativa *et al.*, (2025) ^[10] explains that connection dependence between owner ships and crew can influence reception fisherman to system distribution applicable results. Thus, results evaluation show that implementation system for results fisherman *purse seine* in Sibolga City has in accordance with minimum provisions of Law No. 16 of 1964 side distribution results, namely 40% for fisherman laborers . However, understanding fisherman to laws, transparency in calculation results, and coaching and supervision government Still need improved so that implementation system for results can walk in a way consistent.

Fishermen's Level of Understanding of the Law

Based on results questionnaire, part of big fisherman Not yet understand contents of Law No. 16 of 1964. This seen from low percentage respondents who know existence rule related system for results between owner ship and child fruit ship crew (ABK). This condition shows that the level of socialization of the law is still very low among fishermen. From a policy evaluation perspective, this situation indicates that the implementation of Law No. 16 of 1964 has not been effective, particularly in terms of information dissemination (socialization) to the target community. Therefore, it can be said that the implementation of this law is still suboptimal and requires improvement, particularly in terms of education and guidance for fishermen. Fishermen's understanding of Law No. 16 of 1964 is presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Understanding fisherman against Law No. 16 of 1964

No	Description	Number of people)	Percentage
1.	Understand	8	20%
2.	Not really understand	12	30%
3.	Do not understand	20	50%
	Total	40	100%

Based on Table 5 above, it can be concluded that majority fisherman No understand applicable laws . Conditions This show that implementation of Law No. 16 of 1964 has not yet walk with Good from side socialization .

The low level of understanding of Law Number 16 of 1964 among fishermen indicates that the policy socialization process has not been running optimally. According to Winarno (2016) ^[17], successful policy implementation is greatly influenced by communication and information delivery to target groups. If policy information is not conveyed effectively, it will be difficult to achieve policy objectives in the field.

Evaluation of Internal and External Factors

An evaluation of internal and external factors was conducted to determine the conditions that influence the implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964 on the profit-sharing system for *purse seine fishermen* in Sibolga City. Internal factors are factors originating from within the fishing business, while external factors are factors originating from outside the fishing business that can influence the implementation of the profit-sharing system for *purse seine fishermen* .

Internal factors originate from within the research object, while external factors originate from outside the research object but can influence the research conditions. Internal factors in this study include fishermen's experience, cooperation between ship owners and crew members, transparency of the profit-sharing system, understanding of Law Number 16 of 1964, and work agreements between ship owners and crew members. Meanwhile, external factors include government support, weather conditions, operational costs, fish prices, and competition between fishermen. This is in line with research by Kusdiantoro *et al.*, (2019) ^[4] which states that the implementation of the fisheries profit-sharing system is influenced by internal factors such as work relationships and fishermen's level of understanding, as well as external factors such as government policies and the economic conditions of the fisheries.

Internal Factors

Internal factors play a crucial role in supporting the success of fishing activities and the implementation of the profit-sharing system. A fisherman's extensive work experience can enhance his or her skills in conducting fishing activities at sea. Furthermore, cooperation between the vessel owner and the crew is also a factor contributing to the smooth operation of fishing operations. Fishermen's work experience significantly influences their ability to improve the effectiveness of fishing and fisheries business management. The results of respondents' assessments of internal factors influencing the implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964 are shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Internal factors influencing the implementation of Law No. 16 of 1964

Internal Factors	Mean	Category
Experience fisherman help activity fishing	3.45	Very good
Cooperation between the ship owner and crew is going well	2.35	Not good
Fishing equipment support activity going to sea	1,975	Not good
The potential of fish resources supports the catch	3,325	Very good
The profit sharing system is carried out transparently	1,675	Not good

Based on Table 6, the internal factors with the highest scores are fishermen's experience (3.45) and fish resource

potential (3.325), both of which are in the very good category. This indicates that fishermen's experience and the availability of fish resources support fishing activities. Meanwhile, cooperation between vessel owners and crew (2.35) and fishing equipment (1.975) are in the poor category. The lowest score is the transparency of the profit-sharing system (1.675), which is in the poor category, indicating that openness regarding catches, operational costs, and profit-sharing calculations is still limited. Transparency is important in fisheries employment relationships because the profit-sharing system is directly related to fishermen's income and fulfillment of their needs.

External Factors

External factors play a crucial role in supporting the sustainability of capture fisheries businesses. Weather conditions, fish prices, and operational costs frequently influence fishing activities and fishermen's income. Furthermore, government support through outreach regarding the profit-sharing system is essential to ensure fishermen understand the implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964. External factors in the fisheries business can impact business productivity, fishermen's income, and the sustainability of fishing activities. The results of respondents' assessments of external factors influencing the implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964 are shown in Table 7.

Table 7: External factors influencing the implementation of No. 16 of 1964

External factors	Mean	Category
The government provides outreach regarding the profit sharing system	1.6	Not good
Condition weather influence results catch fisherman	1.75	Not good
Cost operational influence income fisherman	3,325	Very good
Fish prices affect distribution results fisherman	3,525	Very good
Competition between fisherman influence results catch	1.9	Not good

Based on Table 7, the external factors with the highest scores are fish prices (3.525) and operational costs (3.325), both of which are in the very good category. Meanwhile, competition between fishermen (1.9) and weather conditions (1.75) are in the poor category. The lowest score is government outreach (1.6) in the poor category, indicating that information dissemination regarding the profit-sharing system to fishermen is still limited. Weather conditions can also affect fishing activities and the results obtained by fishermen, ultimately impacting income.

Evaluation Implementation Profit Sharing System

Implementation system for results for fishermen *purse seine* in Sibolga City done after results fish sales reduced cost operational arrest. Based on results research, distribution applied results is 60% for owner ship and 40% for crew. Distribution the done based on the agreement that has been applies among fisherman .

Based on results research, system for results by 60% for owner ships and 40% for crew members have fulfil provision Constitution Number 16 of 1964. In article 3 paragraph (1) letter b, fishermen cultivators in business fishery sea get at least 40% of the results net. Thus, the 40% share received by ABK in Sibolga City has meet the specified minimum limits in Constitution.

Internal factors influencing the implementation of the profit-sharing system include the experience of fishermen, cooperation between the vessel owner and crew, fishing equipment, fish resource potential, and the transparency of the profit-sharing system. These factors can support the smooth running of fishing activities, but transparency still needs to be improved so that crew members understand the basis for calculating their share.

In addition, external factors such as weather conditions, operational costs, fish prices, competition among fishermen, and government support also influence income and the implementation of the profit-sharing system. The government's lack of public awareness of Law No. 16 of 1964 has resulted in some fishermen still having limited understanding of the profit-sharing provisions.

The 40% share of the labor fishermen's share is then distributed to the crew based on their respective roles and responsibilities. The captain receives a larger share because he is responsible for leading the fishing activities, while the other crew members receive shares according to their respective duties. This distribution still needs to pay attention to the provision that the ratio of the largest to the smallest share among the labor fishermen does not exceed 3:1. According to Alvanza *et al.*, (2026), *the distribution of results to the crew of purse seine vessels* is generally carried out based on their respective positions and responsibilities.

Thus, the evaluation results indicate that the profit-sharing system for *purse seine fishermen* in Sibolga City complies with the minimum requirement of Law Number 16 of 1964, which is 40% for labor fishermen. However, transparency in calculations, fishermen's understanding of regulations, and government outreach still need to be improved to ensure a more transparent and consistent implementation of the profit-sharing system.

Evaluation Income Fisherman

Income fisherman *purse seine* in Sibolga City influenced by the number results catch, fish price, costs operational, as well as system for Applied results. Fishermen's income is influenced by production results, operational costs, and the fisheries management system. Based on the research results, the income of ship owners is greater than that of crew members because ship owners act as capital providers and managers of fishing businesses.

Fishermen's income evaluation was conducted to determine the amount of income received by the vessel owner and crew based on the profit-sharing system implemented. Based on the research results in Table 9, the average net income of the *purse seine business* was Rp283,530,796 per trip. Of this net income, the vessel owner received a share of 60% or Rp170,118,477 per trip, while the crew received a share of 40% or Rp113,412,318 per trip. This income difference indicates that the vessel owner's share is greater because the owner bears the capital, fishing gear, operational costs, and business risks.

Conclusion

Based on the results of research on the Evaluation of the Implementation of Law Number 16 of 1964 on *purse seine fishermen* in Sibolga City, North Sumatra Province, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The implementation of Law No. 16 of 1964 for *purse seine fishermen* in Sibolga City has complied with the applicable minimum requirements. The profit-sharing system applied is 60% for the vessel owner and 40% for the crew, after deducting operational costs. The 40% share received by the crew meets the minimum requirements for fishermen engaged in marine fishing activities using motorized vessels. However, implementation in the field still faces weaknesses in the transparency of catch calculations and operational costs, as well as a low level of understanding among some fishermen regarding Law No. 16 of 1964.
2. The evaluation results show that the implementation of the profit-sharing system for *purse seine fishermen* in Sibolga City is influenced by several internal and external factors. The internal factors that were considered excellent were the fishermen's experience and potential fish resources, while cooperation between boat owners and crew members, as well as fishing gear, were categorized as poor. Transparency was the weakest internal factor, categorized as poor. External factors included operational costs and fish prices, which were categorized as excellent, while government outreach was categorized as poor, and weather and competition among fishermen were categorized as poor.

Suggestion

Based on the research results and conclusions outlined, efforts are needed to improve transparency and understanding in the implementation of the profit-sharing

system for *purse seine fishermen* in Sibolga City. Therefore, the following recommendations can be made:

1. The government, particularly the Sibolga City Fisheries Service and related agencies, needs to increase outreach regarding Law Number 16 of 1964 to ship owners and crew members so they understand their rights and obligations. The government also needs to improve guidance and supervision of the implementation of the profit-sharing system in the field.
2. Ship owners are expected to increase transparency by providing information on sales revenue, operating costs, and the basis for calculating net profit to crew members. This is crucial for building trust and maintaining a good working relationship between ship owners and crew members.
3. Fishermen and crew members are expected to improve their understanding of Law Number 16 of 1964 and become more actively aware of their rights and obligations under the profit-sharing system. This way, crew members can participate in realizing a transparent profit-sharing system that complies with applicable regulations.

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